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In Stuart Hall’s 1988 essay on Antonio Gramsci 
and the relevance of his thought for understand-
ing Thatcherism, Hall writes the following: 
»People in their right minds do not think that Britain 
is now a wonderfully booming, successful economy. 
But Thatcherism, as an ideology, addresses the fears, 
the anxieties, the lost identities, of a people. It invites 
us to think about politics in images. It is addressed 
to our collective fantasies, to Britain as an imagined 
community, to the social imaginary (…) Without the 
deepening of popular participation in national-cul-
tural life, ordinary people don‘t have any experience 
of actually running anything. We need to re-acquire 
the notion that politics is about expanding popular 
capacities, the capacities of ordinary people. And in 
order to do so, socialism itself has to speak to the 
people whom it wants to empower, in words that be-
long to them as late 20th century ordinary folks.«4 
Hall 1988, emphasis mine 
Even though written thirty years ago, this passage 
speaks to our epoch as well. Strong, authoritarian 
leaders attract voters not by bringing them better 
economic conditions, but by seemingly answer-
ing their anxieties, grievances about lost identities, 
and by offering pleasing and soothing images 
and fantasies. On the other hand, we – the ever 
elusive and self-righteous figure comprising of 
progressive intellectuals, active citizens, engaged 
activists etc. – are appalled; we want an end to 
autocracies, and a change in politics, and in peo-
ple’s hearts and minds. Some of us too, like Hall 
in 1988, want »ordinary people« to »expand their 
capacities«, and hence we generally look with 
enthusiasm at recently emerging protests and 
movements throughout the region. And we want 
4 The essay can be found here: https://www.versobooks.com/
blogs/2448-stuart-hall-gramsci-and-us.
to »address the people whom we want to empow-
er in words that belong to them as 21st century 
»ordinary folks.« Yet a couple of problems seem 
to arise immediately from this unclear relation, 
both connecting and separating »us« and »them«. 
Firstly, there is the obvious paradox of thinking 
about, and designing top-down incentives meant 
to strengthen bottom-up »organic« movements. 
There is something inherently self-denying in an 
effort to answer the question »how to help peo-
ple self-organize?« Furthermore, this unspoken 
presumption that certain (external) actors are 
needed for a meaningful and effective citizens’ ac-
tion to take place contributes to the very sense of 
powerlessness among citizens that usually, post 
festum, comes to be seen as a manifestation of a 
political culture of passivity and dependence. 
Secondly, this presumption is also connected 
with our widespread fears of the masses, of their 
political illiteracy and alleged irrationality, as the 
specter of populism haunts academic and expert 
circles time and again. This fear is legitimized by 
accounts of poor political culture, that, the narra-
tive further goes, desperately needs improvement 
and strengthening – which then brings us back to 
the question of who is the enlightening subject ca-
pable of »doing the job«.
To break this vicious circle of a never quite identi-
fiable them who lack proper political culture and 
us who allegedly know the diagnosis but are un-
certain about the medicine, and to properly ac-
knowledge the fact that we are all stuck together 
in societies with deeply unsatisfying levels of de-
mocracy, I propose re-examining the very notion of 
political culture and the way it is commonly used. 
The claim that our societies are characterized by 
citizens’ passivity, clientelistic behavior, receptive-
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ness for authoritarian messages, etc. is hardly dis-
putable. The question is, however, whether these 
phenomena are best understood, and dealt with, 
as manifestations of political culture. There is a 
longstanding critique of describing political pro-
cesses in terms of cultural traits of any kind, as 
the notion of culture inherently implies traditional 
ways of doing things, shared beliefs and common 
practices, blurring the role of changing situations, 
actors, and contexts shaping and conditioning 
political attitudes and behavior (Asad 1973, Kuper 
1999, Rapport 2007). 
In this respect, a presumption that social and po-
litical processes depend on political culture, which 
is in turn defined as »the sum of the fundamental 
values, sentiments and knowledge that give form 
and substance to political processes« (Pye 1995: 
965)5 is in my mind deeply problematic. Mostly 
because it posits that, while politics is something 
processual and changing, values, sentiments, and 
knowledge are to be understood as something 
fundamental. Not only that it is flawed because it 
ignores how values and knowledge of every so-
ciety are always heterogeneous, and constantly 
prone to change, but it could also be argued that, 
in fact, the very opposite is true: it is political pro-
cesses themselves that shape the values, senti-
ments and knowledge (of a polity/society/state). 
The recent political history of Serbia provides 
some examples. After the regime change in 2000, 
and some steady initial successes of EU inte-
gration, culminating with 2009 visa liberalization, 
citizens of Serbia overwhelmingly supported EU 
integration (more than 74 %). Seven years later, 
in 2016, the support dropped to less than 45 %.6 
More importantly, let us not forget that there was 
a period of time when finally it seemed possible to 
engage the greater public in the discussion about 
war crimes and atrocities from the 1990s wars. In 
2007, on the day the Belgrade District Court sen-
tenced the members of the paramilitary »Scor-
pions« unit for executing Bosniak men and boys 
in Srebrenica in 1995, national television aired a 
5 This definition was also used in the argument of the workshop »Poli-
tical Culture in the Western Balkans« which preceded this publication.
6 https://www.b92.net/bbc/index.php?yyyy=2018&mm=08&dd=30&nav_
id=1437212.
documentary detailing the crimes of the »Scorpi-
ons« that reached an overwhelming audience.7 In 
2010, the Parliament of Serbia adopted a resolu-
tion condemning the crime in Srebrenica. Indeed, 
during the state presidencies of Tadić and Josi-
pović, Serbia and Croatia had the best bilateral 
relations, and the two presidents backed a region-
al agreement on the prosecution of war crimes. 
All of these political decisions had an impact on 
citizens’ attitudes, ethnic distances, sentiments, 
and values. The change of political circumstanc-
es and leaders, the need for new political elites to 
set the dominant agenda differently – especially 
by controlling both state-owned and private me-
dia – quickly translates into prevailing narratives, 
values, and attitudes. Additionally, we should not 
look at these processes as contained within the 
nation-states, or even solely within the region. 
They are intertwined with messages and politics 
streaming from the EU and other political centers, 
having (and changing) their own vision about the 
desirable state of affairs in the WB. 
Therefore, if we still want to talk about political 
culture – referring to the conditions enabling the 
emergence of both dominant political forces, and 
those challenging them – we need to be cautious 
of falling into the trap of ascribing it to mentali-
ties and historical predeterminations (which the 
notion of culture often does). Instead, we must 
fully acknowledge complex interdependencies, 
internal dynamics and external factors, and the 
wider political constellations that this region is a 
part of. Only then can we also properly assess and 
become effectively part of the emerging forces of 
dissent. 
To conclude, I will refer to the recent text by politi-
cal scientists Ferrera and Burelli (2019, forthcom-
ing) dealing with political and economic stability 
of the EU after the crisis. They develop a notion 
that EU needs to be considered not as sum of its 
parts but as a complex adaptive system due to 
»the degree of interconnection and the pressures 
of mutual adjustment among the parts of a col-
lective.« Properties of such systems are irreduc-
7 https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/701057.html. On the influence of 
such documentary films on shaping and changing citizens’ attitudes 
and sentiments in the region, see Werner 2016.
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ible and irreversible: »Irreducibility means that it is 
virtually impossible to disentangle systemic from 
sub-systemic causal dynamics; systemic proper-
ties are non-localizable and non-aggregative. Irre-
versibility means that initial conditions cannot be 
reconstituted via decomposition.« 
In a similar vein, I believe that the space of the 
Western Balkans has become a complex adaptive 
system where the degree of interconnectedness 
of local political elites, EU politics, economic and 
geopolitical interests is at such a level that it is im-
possible to single out political culture as a factor 
in itself, supposedly comprising of autonomously 
functioning sets of beliefs, values and attitudes. 
Only once we accept and fully realize that the po-
litical conditions and practices we want to change 
are not part of the inherited cultural repertoire, but 
are shaped by highly complex and intertwined 
structural and socio-economic processes, will we 
be able to respond with adequate (political and 
structural) propositions and solutions that might 
»expand popular capacities« and bring about the 
desired change. 
